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!!
GORILLAS	IN	THE	HOUSE		
OF	LIGHT	
!
!
London	Zoo	and	the	Modernist	Project	
!
!
!
Five	shuf6le	past	a	plate-glass	door.	Two	men	in	coats.	A	family	of	three:	a	small	
girl	topped	with	a	knitted	hat	pulled	along	by	her	father	and	mother.	They	pass	
through	 a	 dark	 space	 of	 curving	 metal	 out	 into	 the	 light.	 A	 guard	 stoops	 to	
unlatch	 and	 seal	 the	 doors	 shut.	 In	 the	 next	 shot,	 a	 sheer	 glass-front	 onto	
something	 that	 might	 be	 a	 laboratory,	 or	 an	 observatory:	 a	 ceiling	 in	 motion,	
rapidly	 sweeping	 about	 to	 6lood	 the	 white	 space	 and	 re6lective	 surface	 of	 the	
glass-screen	with	sun.	The	eye	can	make	nothing	of	this.	Nothing	is	substantial,	
nothing	 is	 still.	 Some	 futurist	 fantasy	of	 a	 vast	 and	abstract	mechanism	 for	 the	
movement	 of	 shadow	 and	 light.	 Both	 building	 and	 a	machine.	 But	what?	 –	 the	
roof	and	wall	fully	retract	to	reveal	a	colossal	cage.	Mok	and	Moina	are	kept	here:	
the	baby	gorillas	at	London	Zoo.	Face	pressed	to	the	bars	and	chicken-wire,	one	
of	 the	 infants	 looks	 up	 to	 the	 right,	 the	 concrete-wall	 curling	 about	 to	 enclose	
him.	In	winter	the	House	is	shut	–	public	in	one	half,	apes	in	the	other.	In	summer	
the	 cage	 is	 revolved	 and	 the	 glass-screen	 pulled	 back	 –	 the	 infant	 gorillas	
occupying	the	complete	circle,	while	the	public	watches	from	without.		
!
In	 this	 motion	 picture	 by	 Lazlo	 Moholy-Nagy,	 The	 New	 Architecture	 and	 the	
London	Zoo	(1936),	the	Gorilla	House	at	London	Zoo,	by	Berthold	Lubetkin’s	6irm	
Tecton,	 is	 hailed	 as	 the	 beginning	 of	 a	 new	 era,	 ushered	 in	 by	 the	 use	 of	
reinforced	 concrete. 	 And	 zoo-enclosures	 were	 a	 signi6icant	 milestone	 for	 the	1
modernist	movement.	For	most	of	those	working-class	Londoners	who	6locked	to	
see	the	gorilla-children	in	their	new	home,	this	was	their	6irst	encounter	with	the	
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new	architecture.	Built	at	a	time	when	the	works	of	the	modernist	mainstream,	
centred	 in	Paris,	 remained	 for	 the	most	part	 on	 the	drawing	board,	 the	Gorilla	
House,	with	subsequent	enclosures	by	Tecton	in	London,	Dudley	and	Whipsnade,	
was	perceived	to	be	providing	a	sane	blueprint	for	the	future	development	of	the	
human	metropolis.	 In	 fact,	 the	 project	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	 form	 of	 animal-
testing.	 As	 science-historian	 Peder	 Anker	 has	 noted,	 Peter	 Chalmers-Mitchell,	
secretary	of	the	Zoological	Society,	believed	that	if	gorillas	and	penguins	could	be	
shown	to	thrive	in	 ‘the	most	unnatural	conditions’	the	same	would	hold	for	the	
poor,	 who	 were	 in	 desperate	 need	 of	 being	 liberated	 from	 their	 “natural”	
conditions	of	criminal	and	6ilthy	slums.	‘It	was	thus	of	revolutionary	importance	
to	display	thriving	animals	in	an	unnatural	setting	as	if	to	prove	that	humans	too	
could	prosper	in	a	new	environment’. 	Following	wide-spread	ruin	in	the	course	2
of	 the	 Blitz,	 this	 ambition	 would	 at	 last	 be	 realised,	 as	 the	 architect	 Lubetkin	
began	to	apply	the	modernist	architecture	he	had	pioneered	at	London	Zoo	to	the	
problem	of	mass-housing.	The	kernel	of	that	future	city	we	now	inhabit	is	this	Le	
Corbusian	machine	for	habitation	in	London	Zoo.	This	6irst	House	of	Light.		
!
The	fate	of	the	infant	gorillas	therefore	holds	peculiar	horror.	After	six	months	in	
their	new	home	Mok	and	Moina	were	dead;	their	bodies	subjected	to	a	Persian	
funeral,	put	 in	a	cage	on	a	roof	 in	 the	sun,	 to	be	picked	clean	by	carrion-crow. 	3
The	tussle	over	where	to	assign	blame	–	to	poor	maintenance	or	to	poor	design	–	
to	 owner	 or	 to	 architect	 –	 must	 now	 seem	 an	 ironic	 foreshadowing	 of	 the	
argument	that	would	rage,	in	subsequent	decades,	over	modernist	mass-housing	
in	the	UK.	I	wish	to	explore	the	possibility	that	the	gorillas	in	their	House	of	Light	
were	not	the	victims	of	an	oversight,	as	the	architect	maintained,	but	of	a	terrible	
mistake	 in	the	Cartesian	philosophy	underpinning	modernist	 thought.	 I	suggest	
that	in	addition	to	representing	a	turning-point	for	modernism,	the	Gorilla	House	
occupies	 an	 important	 place	 in	 the	 crisis	 in	 humanism	 identi6ied	 by	 Jacques	
Derrida.	 The	 gorilla	 can	be	 seen	 to	 have	possessed	 extraordinary	 resonance	 in	
the	 early	 twentieth	 century;	 a	 symbol	 for	 a	 crisis	 of	 faith	 in	 the	 Cartesian	
de6inition	of	the	human	being.	
!
!
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I.	
THE	ANIMAL-MACHINE	
!
In	The	Animal	That	Therefore	I	Am	(2007)	Derrida	set	out	to	track	the	systematic	
relegation	 of	 the	 Animal	 in	 western	 philosophy	 back	 to	 the	 theoretical	 break	
initiated	 by	 Descartes;	 the	 stark	 binary	 that	 de6ines	 the	 human	 by	 corralling	
every	other	species	on	the	planet	into	a	single	concept,	under	a	single	name,	“The	
Animal”. 	This	consistent	characterisation	of	the	Animal	as	that	which	is	deprived	4
of	the	Logos,	the	right	and	power	to	respond,	is	the	root	of	the	misery	in6licted	on	
other	animal	species	by	humans,	or	on	other	humans	unfortunate	enough	to	have	
themselves	 been	 marked	 out	 as	 “Animal”.	 The	 Gorillas	 in	 the	 House	 of	 Light	
represent	 the	 culmination	 of	 this	 Enlightenment	 reduction	 of	 the	 Animal:	 the	
subject	is	held	in	a	fearsome	geometry,	a	lyrical	celebration	of	human	reason.	But	
this	 extremity	 is	 also	 a	 symptom	 of	 societal	 unease	 –	 an	 anthropocentric	
reinstitution	of	the	superiority	of	the	Human	over	the	Animal	that	testi6ies	to	the	
panic	generated	by	 ‘humanity’s	second	trauma’:	evolution	–	the	knowledge	that	
mankind	 is	 intimately	 involved	 in	 everything	 that	 he	 had	 for	 so	 long	 tried	 to	
disavow	as	other,	as	Animal.		
!
But	what	did	Rene	Descartes	actually	say,	and	 in	what	way	does	his	 theoretical	
formulation	 of	 the	 human-animal	 binary	differ	 from	 the	 earlier	 idea	 stretching	
right	back	to	Aristotle	 that	man	 is	an	animal	distinguished	 from	the	rest	by	his	
capacity	 for	 rational	 thought:	 the	 Rational	 Animal?	 As	 Derrida	 points	 out,	
Descartes	 is	 a	 man	 in	 a	 hurry,	 compelled	 to	 eliminate	 everything	 that	 is	 not	
certain	 and	 indubitable.	 Here	 is	 the	 passage	 in	 the	 Meditations	 in	 which	
Descartes	called	time	on	the	earlier	de6inition:	
!
	 What,	then,	did	I	formerly	think	I	was?	I	thought	I	was	a	man.	But	what	is	a	
	 man?	 Shall	 I	 say	 rational	 animal?	 No	 indeed:	 for	 it	 would	 be	 necessary	
	 next	to	inquire	what	is	meant	by	animal,	and	what	by	rational,	and,	in	this	
	 way,	 from	one	 single	question,	we	would	 fall	unwittingly	 into	an	 in6inite	
	 number	of	others,	more	dif6icult	and	awkward	than	the	6irst,	and	I	would	
	 not	wish	to	waste	the	little	time	and	leisure	remaining	to	me	by	using	it	to	
	 unravel	subtleties	of	this	kind. 	5
!
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To	arrive	at	what	“I	am”	it	is	necessary	to	begin	by	dismissing	the	concept	of	the	
rational	animal.	This	frees	Descartes	to	reach	a	new	formulation	in	Discourse	on	
Method	 –	 “I	 think	 therefore	 I	 am”. 	 On	 6irst	 impression,	 this	might	 seem	 to	 be	6
merely	reasserting	the	idea	that	man's	de6ining	characteristic	is	reason:	I	think	–	
I	have	the	capacity	for	rational	thought.	But	what	must	follow?	I	am	a	Man?	No.	I	
think	therefore	I	AM.	Something	truly	radical	has	taken	place	here	in	relation	to	
that	 earlier	 tradition;	 a	moment	of	 rupture	 that	has	had	profound	 implications	
for	 humanity's	 relationship	 to	 the	 Animal.	 In	 a	 startling	move	 the	 capacity	 for	
rational	thought	has	been	equated	with	Being	itself,	with	the	very	Name	of	God.		
!
Previous	 philosophers	 had	 insisted	 that	 the	 animal	 lacked	 reason,	 though	
Aristotle,	 for	 instance,	 clearly	 believed	 that	 humans	 and	 animals	 shared	much	
else.	 Certain	 animals	 possessed	 qualities	 nearly	 akin	 to	 those	 common	 to	
mankind	in	greater	or	less	measure:	“For	just	as	we	pointed	out	resemblances	in	
the	 physical	 organs,	 so	 in	 a	 number	 of	 animals	 we	 observe	 gentleness	 and	
6ierceness,	mildness	or	cross-temper,	courage	or	timidity,	fear	or	con6idence,	high	
spirits	 or	 low	 cunning,	 and	 with	 regard	 to	 intelligence,	 something	 akin	 to	
sagacity.” 	In	contrast,	the	new	means	for	de6ining	the	essence	of	what	it	is	to	be	7
human	cut	us	off	from	animals	in	the	world,	and	from	everything	that	is	animal	in	
our	own	selves.	“But	I,	who	am	certain	that	I	am,	do	not	yet	know	clearly	enough	
what	 I	 am;	 so	 that	 henceforth	 I	 must	 take	 great	 care	 not	 imprudently	 to	 take	
some	 other	 object	 for	 myself,	 and	 thus	 avoid	 going	 astray	 in	 this	 knowledge	
which	I	maintain	to	be	more	certain	and	evident	than	all	I	have	had	hitherto. 	To	8
this	 end	 Descartes	 abstracted	 from	 the	 “I	 am”	 his	 own	 living	 body,	 which	 is	
presented	 objectively	 as	 a	 machine	 or	 corpse:	 “I	 considered	 myself,	 6irstly,	 as	
having	a	face,	hands,	arms,	and	the	whole	machine	made	up	of	6lesh	and	bones,	
such	as	it	appears	in	a	corpse	and	which	I	designated	by	the	name	of	body”. 	In	9
short,	he	is	a	“thing	that	thinks”. 	And	anything	lacking	the	capacity	for	rational	10
thought	is	nothing	more	than	a	machine,	is	empty	of	the	living	Name	of	God.	The	
Animal	 is	 therefore,	 in	 a	 sense,	 unreal:	 no	 longer	 capable	 of	 a	 meaningful	
response	–	of	saying	“I	am”.		
!
In	order	to	illustrate	this	point,	Descartes	presents	us	with	a	famous	allegory	that	
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curiously	 anticipates	 the	 science-6iction	 of	 Philip	 K.	 Dick.	 Imagine	 a	 future	 in	
which	man	has	never	seen	an	animal.	 Imagine	man	has	created	a	machine	 that	
precisely	 simulated	 the	 appearance,	 movement	 and	 sound	 of	 an	 irrational	
animal. 	 According	 to	 Descartes,	 one	 could	 not	 distinguish	 between	 real	 and	11
simulated	animal,	because	there	would	be	no	fundamental	difference.	But	no	one	
could	 make	 such	 a	 mistake	 if	 confronted	 with	 a	 clockwork	 man,	 and	 this	 is	
because	 the	human	being	 is	 capable	of	 responding	 in	 intelligent	 fashion	 to	any	
questions	put	to	him.	
!
	 And	this	shows	not	only	that	animals	have	less	reason	than	men,	but	that	
	 they	have	none	at	all;	for	we	see	that	very	little	of	it	is	required	in	order	to	
	 be	able	 to	speak;	and	since	one	notices	 inequality	among	animals	of	 the	
	 same	species	as	well	as	among	men,	and	that	some	are	easier	to	train	than	
	 others,	 it	 is	 unbelievable	 that	 the	most	 perfect	 monkey	 or	 parrot	 of	 its	
	 species	should	not	equal	in	this	the	most	stupid,	or	at	least	a	child	with	a	
	 disturbed	 brain,	 unless	 their	 souls	 were	 not	 of	 an	 altogether	 different	
	 nature	from	our	own. 		12
!
!
II.	
THE	HORROR	OF	THE	APE	
!
The	discovery	of	the	Gorilla	 in	the	nineteenth	century	posed	a	challenge	to	this	
classic	 thought-experiment,	 presenting	 new	 possibilities	 that	 were	 to	 prove	
profoundly	unsettling	 to	 the	hard-and-fast	 categories	of	humanist	 thought.	The	
earliest	 specimens	 (a	 skull	 and	 other	 bones)	 were	 obtained	 by	 the	 American	
physician	and	missionary	Thomas	Staughton	Savage	in	Liberia,	and	presented	to	
the	 scienti6ic	 community	 as	 Troglodytes	 Gorilla	 in	 Proceedings	 of	 the	 Boston	
Society	 of	 Natural	 History	 in	 1847. 	 The	 6irst	 part	 of	 the	 name	 simply	means	13
cave-dweller	but	the	second	part	is	derived	from	a	mysterious	word	that	occurs	
in	the	Periplus	of	Hanno	the	Navigator;	–	a	Greek	translation	of	a	Punic	account	of	
a	 voyage	 along	 the	 coast	 of	 West	 Africa	 in	 the	 6ifth	 century	 BCE. 	 After	14
cataloguing	the	fauna	and	prominent	landmarks	encountered	(a	mountain	of	the	
gods,	a	 river	of	 6ire	pouring	 into	 the	sea),	Hanno	speaks	of	a	skirmish	between	
the	Carthagenians	and	a	tribe	of	hairy	folk:			
!
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	 By	6lame	for	three	days	to	South	Horn,	the	bayou,	
	 the	island	of	folk	hairy	and	savage	
	 whom	our	Lixtae	said	were	Gorillas.	
	 We	cd.	not	take	any	man,	but	three	of	their	women.	
	 Their	men	clomb	up	the	crags,	
	 Rained	stone,	but	we	took	three	women	
	 who	bit,	scratched,	wd.	not	follow	their	takers.	
	 Killed,	6layed,	brought	back	their	pelts	into	Carthage.	
	 Went	no	further	that	voyage,	
	 	 as	were	at	end	of	provisions. 	15
!
Neither	Greek	nor	Punic,	 the	word	gorilla	might	be	related	 to	gorku,	 the	Fulani	
word	for	man,	the	diminutive	form	of	which	is	gorel. 	But	it	is	impossible	to	be	16
sure	if	the	gorilla	should	be	identi6ied	as	a	forgotten	breed	of	hominid	or	with	the	
species	 later	 designated	 as	 such.	 In	 any	 event,	 this	 name	 proved	 an	 inspired	
choice;	 with	 its	 echo	 of	 a	 remote,	 mythical	 past,	 gorilla	 6ired	 the	 imagination,	
initiating	a	rush	for	specimens,	on	the	part	of	museums	across	the	world.		
!
The	 6irst	 stuffed	gorillas	were	displayed	 in	Paris	 in	1852.	The	explorer	Paul	du	
Chaillu	became	the	6irst	western-man	to	see	a	living	gorilla	on	his	expedition	of	
1856-59,	and	brought	the	6irst	dead	specimen	to	England	in	1861. 	But	in	spite	17
of	 the	 mounting	 interest	 provoked	 by	 these	 scienti6ic	 discoveries,	 which	 only	
intensi6ied	following	publication	of	Charles	Darwin's	theory	of	evolution	in	1859,	
no	systematic	 6ield-study	took	place	before	the	second	quarter	of	 the	twentieth	
century,	 when	 the	 American	 Museum	 of	 Natural	 History	 sent	 Carl	 Akeley	 to	
secure	 specimens	 for	 the	 collection. 	 For	 over	 seventy	 years	 the	 term	 gorilla	18
would	 mark,	 no	 less	 than	 it	 had	 in	 the	 time	 of	 Hanno,	 the	 point	 at	 which	
knowledge	 failed,	 the	edge	of	uncharted	territory	–	a	space	 for	speculation	and	
for	doubt.		
!
First,	 and	 perhaps	 most	 unsettling,	 of	 the	 new	monsters	 to	 emerge	 from	 this	
vanishing	point,	is	the	sculpture	Gorilla	Dragging	Away	a	Dead	Negress	(1859)	by	
Emmanuel	Fremiert.	In	this	colossal	image	there	is	none	of	the	twisted	eroticism	
that	hindsight	might	lead	us	to	expect	in	this	the	6irst	representation	of	that	now	
familiar	trope	of	the	gorilla	and	the	girl.	Crushed	tight	by	a	huge	stubby	hand,	the	
woman's	face	and	body	are	pressed	into	the	6labby	bulk	of	a	female	gorilla;	a	big	
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hoop	swings	from	the	ear	beneath	an	elaborate	head	dress;	the	robes	are	heavy,	
funereal;	the	arm	let	swing	is	not	that	of	some	sylph	from	the	Salon	but	muscular;	
the	6ingers	a	taut	claw;	no	poetry,	no	glamour;	a	real	corpse.	The	gorilla's	face	is	a	
blank	 –	 6ixed	 snarl	 –	 but	 the	 eyes	 are	 sad.	 Surging	 forward,	 the	 gorilla	 is	 an	
unstoppable	force	bearing	the	away	the	dead.	But	it	is	impossible	to	read	reasons	
or	circumstances	into	this	sombre	tableau.	The	piece	possesses	a	mystery	that	is	
profoundly	 troubling;	 something	 terrible	 has	 taken	 place,	 something	 on	 a	
mythical	order,	not	spelt	out.	Exhibited	in	the	same	year	that	saw	the	publication	
of	the	Origin	of	Species,	 it	is	little	wonder	that	the	Paris	Salon	refused	to	exhibit	
the	piece,	only	consenting	to	do	so	on	the	condition	that	the	gorilla	was	screened	
by	 a	 curtain;	 or	 that	 they	 should	 have	 hastened	 to	 have	 had	 the	 sculpture	
destroyed	after	 the	exhibition.	The	gorilla	entered	 the	art	of	 the	west	 freighted	
with	humanity's	second	trauma,	hauling	off	the	shell	of	what	was	once	thought	to	
be	the	image	of	God.		
!
Fremiet's	 next	 treatment	 of	 the	 motif	 greatly	 re6ined	 the	 gorilla's	 symbolic	
potential.	His	Gorilla	Carrying	Off	a	Woman	of	1887	won	the	Paris	Salon	Medal	of	
Honour,	 and	 the	Republic	 approved	 a	 bronze	 reproduction	 edition	 that	 proved	
highly	 popular. 	 This	 is	 rather	 a	 curious	 reversal,	 since	 this	 image	 is	 more	19
sensational	 than	the	6irst.	Once	again	a	gorilla	 is	pulling	away	a	woman,	 tucked	
tight	 under	 biceps	 –	 but	 the	 woman	 is	 beating	 and	 pushing	 the	 monster,	 her	
breasts	crushed	big	against	the	ape,	her	thighs	behind	soft	and	full;	embodying	a	
sensuality	 in	shocking	 juxtaposition	with	an	 immense	knot	of	bone	and	muscle	
and	hair;	no	uncertainty,	no	ambiguity	as	to	intent;	an	alpha-male	gorilla	in	heat;	
hefting	a	sharp-edged	rock,	screaming	 through	a	mouthful	of	 fang.	But	 in	some	
respects	this	image	is	safer,	though	more	explicit,	rather	more	conventional,	than	
the	 group	 of	 1859.	 The	 original	 was	 shocking	 because	 Fremiet	 had	 chosen	 to	
adopt	a	style	that	drew	upon	his	training	as	an	illustrator	at	the	Parisian	Museum	
of	 Natural	 History.	 Stif6ly	 respectable,	 rigorously	 researched	 and	 anatomically	
correct,	 best	 remembered	 for	 the	 Terrible	 Lizards	 that	 roam	 through	 Crystal	
Palace	 Park	 –	 that	 stocky	 mid-Victorian	 Naturalism	 which	 had	 become	
inextricably	identi6ied	with	scienti6ic	veracity.	In	contrast,	the	later	Gorilla	is	in	a	
style	more	 in	keeping	with	 the	aesthetic	of	 the	Paris	Salon.	The	woman	 is	now	
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Caucasian,	the	scene	is	of	no	particular	time	or	place	but	is	set	in	some	mythical	
past.	 The	 sculpture	 could	 be	 taken	 as	 a	 modern	 recapitulation	 of	 the	
Centauromachy	 –	 an	 allegory	 in	 classical	 art,	 expressing	humanity's	 struggle	 to	
overcome	the	irrational	or	animal.	The	motif	had	been	recon6igured	as	a	con6lict	
–	the	outcome	of	which	was	far	from	as	clear	cut	as	might	initially	appear.		
!
Fremiet’s	 iconic	 revision	 of	 the	 Gorilla	 and	 the	 Girl	 is	 recapitulated	 with	
remarkably	 little	 elaboration	 in	 the	 scores	 of	 gorilla-related	 horrormovies	 that	
were	produced	 in	 the	early	 twentieth	century.	One	recent	survey	 indicates	 that	
one	hundred	6ilms	with	gorillas	were	made	between	1908	and	1948	and	of	these	
the	vast	majority	were	horrors. 	Most	of	the	gorillas	in	the	genre	were	played	by	20
men	 in	gorilla-costumes	–	a	dedicated	band	of	professional	ape-impersonators,	
often	taking	their	passion	for	realism	to	alarming	lengths.	If	no	one	has	heard	of	
Charlie	 Gemora,	 the	Master	 of	 the	 Art,	 in	 part	 this	 is	 because	 this	 remarkable	
actor	 would	 insist	 on	 having	 his	 name	 removed	 from	 the	 credits	 in	 order	 to	
maintain	 the	 realism	of	 the	production.	 The	maker	 of	 his	 own	gorilla-suit,	 and	
the	 sculptor	 of	 the	 gigantic	 hand	 that	 reaches	 into	 a	 hotel-room	 to	 snatch	 Fay	
Wray	in	King	Kong	(1933),	Charlie	Gemora	was	the	leading	6igure	in	a	genre	that	
testi6ies	 to	 the	 tremendous	 unease	 that	 surrounded	 these	 recently	 discovered	
creatures	 in	 the	 public	 mind,	 rehearsing	 the	 psychopathologies	 the	 collapsing	
Cartesian	 paradigm	 had	 generated	 beneath	 the	 veneer	 of	 twentieth-century	
culture;	often	with	surprising	sensitivity	and	sophistication.		
!
The	motif	of	the	gorilla	and	the	girl,	repeated	ad	inMinitum	in	these	6ilms,	owed	its	
popularity	to	the	fact	that	it	successfully	channelled	as	yet	vague	new	fears	into	a	
familiar	 and	 	 therefore	 reassuring	 template:	 the	 con6lict	 between	Man	 and	 his	
Inner	 Animal.	 This	 fact	 is	 nowhere	 clearer	 than	 in	 Edward	 D.	Wood	 Jnr’s	 sole	
contribution	 to	 the	genre	–	his	brilliantly	 twisted	script	 for	Bride	and	the	Beast	
(1958),	in	which	a	couple	have	their	wedding-night	disturbed	by	the	violent	bull-
gorilla	 that	 the	 husband,	 Dan,	 keeps	 locked	 up	 in	 a	 dungeon	 (complete	 with	
6laming	torches)	underneath	the	house.	The	gorilla	 is	called	Spanky,	and	Dan	is	
not	a	little	disturbed	to	discover	that	his	new	wife	(played	by	Charlotte	Austin),	
who	 insists	 on	 sleeping	 in	 a	 separate	 bed	 to	 her	 husband,	 smoulders	 with	 a	
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sexual	 intensity	 rarely	 caught	 on	 celluloid	 whenever	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 the	
gorilla.	A	 jealous	Dan	shoots	Spanky	dead,	 and	Charlotte	Austin	 is	 subjected	 to	
hypnotherapy	 and	 regressed	 to	 a	 past	 life,	 in	which	 she	was	 an	 albino	 gorilla.	
Readers	who	have	seen	Tim	Burton's	wonderful	biopic	Ed	Wood	(1994),	will	have	
no	 dif6iculty	 in	 recognising	 the	 confession	 that	 emerges	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	
hypnosis	 as	 an	 expression	 of	 the	 director's	 own	 unconventional	 sexual	 drives:	
“Soft	 like	 kitten's	 fur”,	 says	 Charlotte	 Austin,	 recalling	 her	 former	 pelt.	 “Felt	 so	
good	on	me.” 	Though	rather	more	candid	in	this	respect	than	most,	the	process	21
of	 projection	 crystallised	 in	 this	 particular	 gorilla-movie	 is	 a	 characteristic	
feature	 of	 a	 genre	 that	 could	 have	 been	 invented	 for	 the	 sole	 purpose	 of	
illustrating	 the	 psychoanalytical	 interpretation	 of	 animal-phobia	 developed	
earlier	 in	the	century	by	Sigmund	Freud.	 In	short,	 this	 is	 the	theory	that	sexual	
desires	 deemed	 abhorrent	 by	 the	 father,	 together	 with	 hatred	 of	 the	 father	
provoked	by	 that	 repression,	 are	displaced	onto	an	Animal.	 “By	wild-beasts	 the	
dream-work	usually	 symbolises	passionate	 impulses,”	Freud	explains;	 “those	of	
the	dreamer,	and	also	those	of	other	persons	of	whom	the	dreamer	is	afraid;	or	
thus,	by	means	of	a	very	slight	displacement,	the	persons	who	experience	those	
passions”. 	 In	 fact,	 Freud's	 thoughts	 on	 this	 topic	 seem	 eerily	 prescient,	when	22
one	remembers	that	so	many	gorillas	in	these	movies	are	treated	precisely	as	a	
totem-animal:	 “From	 [the	 dream]	 it	 is	 not	 very	 far	 to	 the	 totemistic	
representation	 of	 the	 dreaded	 father	 by	 means	 of	 vicious	 animals,	 dogs,	 wild	
horses,	etc.	One	might	say	 that	wild-beasts	serve	to	represent	 the	 libido,	 feared	
by	the	ego,	and	combated	by	repression.” 						23
!
‘The	 con6lict	 between	 Man	 and	 his	 Inner	 Animal’:	 this	 is	 clearly	 how	 many	
engaging	with	the	trope	of	the	gorilla	at	the	time	explained	the	motif	themselves.	
Consider	Aldous	Huxley's	satirical	representation	of	the	American	6ilm-industry	
in	Ape	and	Essence	(1948).	Huxley	picks	up	on	the	recurring	imagery	of	the	ape	in	
6ilms	produced	in	this	era,	and	incorporates	this	into	a	meta-6ictional	6ilm-script	
discovered	 by	 an	 exploratory	 expedition	 sent	 to	 a	 Hollywood	 destroyed	 by	
nuclear	war.	 In	the	following	passage	the	Freudian-Darwinian	understanding	of	
the	horror	of	the	ape	outlined	above	is	presented	as	self-evident:		
!
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	 Surely	it's	obvious	.	
	 Doesn't	every	schoolboy	know	it?	
	 Ends	are	ape-chosen;	only	the	means	are	man's	.	.	.		
	 Church	and	State,	
	 Greed	and	Hate:	–	
	 Two	Baboon-Persons	in	one	Supreme	Gorilla. 		24
!
But	there	is	a	problem	with	this	psychoanalytical	approach.	The	Animal	itself	 is	
entirely	 eliminated	 from	 the	 equation.	 The	 speci6ic	 horror	 of	 the	 ape	 is	
neutralised	in	the	moment	of	its	expression.	In	becoming	a	sign	for	the	“bestial”	–	
the	 term	which	most	 accurately	 describes	 the	 horror	 of	what	 you	 see	 in	 these	
movies	–	 the	gorilla	has	become	a	 symbol	of	 something	 from	which	beasts	 are	
exempt	by	de6inition.	As	Derrida	has	observed,	“One	cannot	speak	...	of	the	bêtise	
or	 bestiality	 of	 an	 animal.	 It	 would	 be	 an	 anthropomorphic	 projection	 of	
something	 that	 remains	 the	 preserve	 of	 man”. 	 In	 presenting	 the	 gorilla	 as	 a	25
symbol	 of	 the	 Inner	 Animal,	 movie-makers	 and	 writers	 were	 re-enacting	 the	
disavowal	of	something	 intrinsically	human.	The	gorilla	 is	reduced	to	an	empty	
sign,	 interchangeable	with	 any	 other	 animal	 species	 in	 a	 structure	 of	meaning	
that	 is	 the	 product	 of	 that	 sign-making	 power	 thought	 proper	 to	 man.	 These	
motion	pictures	ultimately	reassert	the	problematic	Cartesian	formulation	of	the	
Human	subject	and	the	Animal	object.	
!
But	is	the	gorilla	interchangeable	with	any	other	species?	It	is	true	every	creature	
imaginable	has	at	 some	point	or	another	been	rendered	an	object	of	horror	by	
the	6ilm-industry;	there	have	been	birds,	there	have	been	sharks,	there	have	even	
been	 killer	 shrews.	 In	 any	 number	 of	 gorilla	 horrormovies,	 from	Bela	 Lugosi's	
Murders	 in	 the	Rue	Morgue	 (1932)	 to	Acquanetta's	Captive	Wild	Women	 (1943)	
the	horror	of	the	ape	can	be	seen	to	derive	not	merely	from	its	role	as	a	symbol,	
one	among	many,	 for	the	depredations	of	the	sub-conscious	mind,	but	 from	the	
fact	that	the	gorilla	was	perceived	to	be	the	embodiment	of	the	challenge	that	the	
great	apes	posed	to	the	thought-experiment	set	out	 in	the	Discourse	on	Method.	
Descartes	 asserted	 that	 the	machine	 or	 animal	would	 always	 be	 recognised	 as	
such	 by	 us	 because	 the	 animal-machine	 could	 not	 respond,	 and	 because	 an	
intelligent	response	could	not	be	simulated.	But	could	the	Logos	be	Aped?		
!
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In	The	Descent	of	Man	 (1871),	Charles	Darwin	had	remarked	that:	“It	 is	not	the	
mere	 power	 of	 articulation	 that	 distinguishes	 man	 from	 other	 animals,	 for	 as	
everyone	knows,	parrots	can	talk;	but	it	is	his	large	power	of	connecting	de6inite	
sounds	with	de6inite	ideas”. 	But	having	clearly	signalled	his	engagement	in	this	26
way	 with	 Cartesian	 Thought,	 Darwin	 then	 observed	 that	 this	 is	 an	 Art	 and	
therefore	achieved	through	imitation:	“As	bearing	on	the	subject	of	imitation,	the	
strong	tendency	in	our	nearest	allies,	the	monkeys,	in	microcephalous	idiots,	and	
in	 the	 barbarous	 races	 of	 mankind,	 to	 imitate	 whatever	 they	 hear	 deserves	
notice”. 	If	those	dull,	stupid	men	mentioned	by	Descartes	could	be	con6lated	in	27
this	way	with	mere	monkeys	and	said	to	be	entirely	capable	of	the	mimicry	that	
permitted	 language,	what	might	 happen	when	 explorers	 eventually	 discovered	
the	“perfect	ape”? 	Could	we	count	on	our	ability	to	tell	the	simulation	or	aping	28
of	a	response	by	this	sophisticated	animal-machine	from	the	real	thing?	
!
One	 should	bear	 in	mind	 just	 how	 little	was	 known	 concerning	 gorillas	 in	 this	
period.	No	one	yet	knew	what	 feats	 these	beasts	were	capable	of	–	and	 for	 the	
vast	majority	of	people	in	the	thirties	and	forties	the	Gorilla	was,	of	course,	a	man	
in	a	costume	called	Charlie	Gemora!	–	It	is	possible	that	the	gorilla	horror-movies	
of	the	period	played	no	small	part	in	exacerbating	anxieties	that	sustained	them,	
presenting	 their	 uninformed	 audiences	with	 preternaturally	 intelligent	 gorilla-
men.	
!
The	 nature	 of	 this	 anxiety	 emerges	 particularly	 clearly	 in	 what	 must	 be	 the	
original	 ape-related	 horror	 story,	 and	 primary	 prototype	 for	 the	 genre	
considered	above,	The	Murders	in	the	Rue	Morgue	(1841)	by	Edgar	Allan	Poe.	The	
unsettling	 effect	 of	 the	 story	 stems	 in	 large	 part	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 sleuth	
Dupin	refers	 to	 the	deaths	 in	 the	Rue	Morgue	as	“murders”	after	he	has	utterly	
eliminated	the	possibility	that	the	perpetrator	could	be	human:	“In	the	manner	of	
thrusting	 the	 corpse	 up	 the	 chimney,	 you	will	 admit	 that	 there	was	 something	
excessively	 outre	 –	 something	 altogether	 irreconcilable	 with	 our	 common	
notions	of	human	action,	even	when	we	suppose	the	actors	the	most	depraved	of	
men”. 	 The	 narrator	 confesses	 to	 feeling	 “a	 creeping	 of	 the	 6lesh”	 on	 hearing	29
Dupin's	 summary	 of	 the	 case;	 and	 one	 can	 understand	 why,	 when	 one	
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appreciates	 that	 a	 murder	 that	 represents	 a	 “horror	 absolutely	 alien	 from	
humanity”	necessarily	involves	a	paradox. 	For	as	Will	Smith	observes	in	I,	Robot	30
(2004),	only	a	human	can	be	guilty	of	homicide	–	a	 restatement	of	 the	 familiar	
Cartesian	con6lation	of	the	human	being	with	the	capacity	for	rational	judgement.	
It	 is	 signi6icant	 that	when	 the	 narrator	 speculates	 “A	madman	 ...	 has	 done	 this	
deed	–	some	raving	maniac,	escaped	from	a	neighbouring	Maison	de	Sant”,	Dupin	
concedes	that	the	“idea	is	not	irrelevant”. 	Presumably	the	idea	is	not	irrelevant	31
because	 a	 madman	 would	 not	 have	 been	 tried	 for	 a	 murder	 in	 any	 court.	 In	
solving	 the	 “murders”	 in	 the	Rue	Morgue,	Dupin	discovers	 that	no	murder	 took	
place	 –	 and	 so	 no	 one	 is	 charged	 for	 this	 offence	 at	 the	 end.	 Because	 the	
perpetrator	is	an	ape.	Not	a	gorilla	–	the	mystery	was	published	six	years	before	
the	 scienti6ic	discovery	of	 that	 species	 –	but	 a	 “large	 fulvous	Ourang-Outang	of	
the	East	Indian	Islands”. 	The	violent	deaths	were	not	murder,	but	the	result	of	32
the	mechanical	imitation	believed	to	be	proper	to	an	ape	–	aping	a	man	shaving	–	
followed	 by	 violent	 reaction	 to	 a	 sudden	 fright.	 Poe	 has	 presented	 the	 reader	
with	the	perfect	simulation	of	a	crime	by	an	animal	lacking	capacity	for	rational	
thought:	the	most	intelligent	men	on	the	Parisian	police-force	have	been	shown	
to	have	failed	that	test	upon	which	Descartes	had	grounded	his	case	for	setting	
human	 beings	 apart	 from	 animal-machines;	 they	 have	 been	 shown	 to	 be	
incapable	of	distinguishing	the	illusion	of	the	Logos	from	the	real	thing.	Nor,	one	
should	 point	 out,	 is	 the	 effect	 of	 Dupin's	 intervention	 exactly	 to	 restore	 these	
imperilled	 boundaries.	 In	 his	 famous	preface,	 Poe	 explains	 that	 the	 purpose	 of	
the	narrative	 is	 to	provide	a	commentary	on	his	proposition	 there	 is	a	hitherto	
unrecognised	 distinction	 between	 ingenuity	 and	 analysis.	 “The	 consecutive	 or	
combining	 power,	 by	 which	 ingenuity	 is	 usually	 manifested,	 and	 to	 which	 the	
phrenologists	(I	believe	erroneously)	have	assigned	a	separate	organ,	supposing	
it	 a	 primitive	 faculty,	 has	 been	 so	 frequently	 seen	 in	 those	 whose	 intellect	
bordered	 otherwise	 upon	 idiocy,	 as	 to	 have	 attracted	 general	 observations	
among	writers	on	morals”. 	Against	the	ingenuity	of	a	retentive	memory	and	of	33
playing	by	 the	book,	 Poe	 sets	 up	 the	 analysis	 that	 he	 characterises	 as	 the	 very	
soul	and	essence	of	method;	“it	is	in	matters	beyond	the	limits	of	mere	rule	that	
the	skill	of	the	analyst	is	evinced”. 	The	narrative	presents	a	very	clear	difference	34
between	the	acumen	of	Dupin	and	the	mere	cunning	of	the	Prefect	of	Police.	But	
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it	 is	hard	 to	say	how	one	can	distinguish	 the	cunning	exhibited	by	 the	Parisian	
Police	 from	 the	 cunning	 exhibited	 –	 to	 rather	 more	 effect!	 –	 by	 the	 Ourang-
Outang.	 In	each	case,	cunning	 is	based	on	a	retentive	memory	and	the	capacity	
for	repeating	certain	procedures	 in	a	mechanical,	unre6lective	way.	Perhaps	 the	
most	 terrifying	 element	 in	 this	 landmark	 horror	 story	 is	 a	 variation	 on	 the	
familiar	Cartesian	distinction	between	 response	and	 reaction	 that	puts	most	of	
humanity	beyond	the	pale,	with	little	or	nothing	to	distinguish	the	“ingenuity”	of	
which	they	boast	from	the	“cunning”	of	the	merely	animal.			
!
The	 full	 implications	 of	 this	 impending	 ontological	 crisis	 are	 set	 out	 in	 Pierre	
Boulle's	 novel	 La	 Planète	 des	 Singes	 (1963).	 The	 6ilm-adaptation,	 Planet	 of	 the	
Apes	(1968)	signi6icantly	revised	the	plot	of	Boulle's	novel	in	order	to	present	a	
timely	 satire	 on	 the	 “bestiality”	 of	mankind,	merely	 recon6irming	 the	Cartesian	
Human-Animal	 binary	 in	 the	 act	 of	 inverting	 it.	 The	 book	 is	 very	 different.	
Everything	 horri6ic	 in	 the	 novel	 stems	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 for	 the	 most	 part	
everyday	 life	 is	 pure	 “reaction”	 rather	 than	 “response”	 –	 and	 can	 therefore	 be	
aped.	 It	 is	 in	 this	 traditional	 belief	 that	 it	 is	 the	 capacity	 for	 imitation	 that	 is	
characteristic	of	 the	ape	 that	 the	speci6ic	anxieties	 that	became	attached	 to	 the	
new	anthropoid	apes,	and	the	unfortunate	gorilla	in	particular,	are	to	be	found.	In	
these	passages	 from	La	Planète	des	Singes	 you	have	 fully	 realised	 the	horror	of	
the	ape.			
!
	 What	is	it	that	characterizes	a	civilisation?	Is	it	the	exceptional	genius?	No,	
	 it	is	everyday		life.	 ...	 Is	 it	 possible	 that	 creatures	 devoid	 of	 intelligence	
	 could	have	perpetuated	it	by	a	simple	process	of	imitation?	...	This	should	
	 be	able	to	be	achieved	by	monkeys,	who	are	essentially	imitators,	provid-
	 ed	of	course	they	are	able	to	make	use	of	language.	...	At	the	level	of	admin-
	 istration,	 the	 quality	 of	 aping	 seemed	 even	 easier	 to	 admit.	 To	 continue	
	 our	system,	the	gorillas	would	merely	have	to	imitate	certain	attitudes	and	
	 deliver	a	few	harangues,	all	based	on	the	same	model. 	35
!
!
!
!
!
!
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III.	
THE	HOUSE	OF	LIGHT	
!
Charlie	Gemora	would	have	 instantly	recognised	 the	compositional	elements	 in	
the	Gorilla	House	at	London	Zoo.	The	 ‘intrinsic	human	ceremony’	enacted	by	a	
porch	ushering	the	public	into	a	dark	theatre. 	And	that	sliding	panel	–	like	the	36
false-walls	that	conceal	Spanky's	dungeon,	or	that	of	Bela	Lugosi	in	The	Ape-Man	
(1943),	 or	 like	 the	 curtains	 that	 screen	 King	 Kong,	 or	 Fremiet's	 6irst	 Gorilla.	
Everything	in	the	approach	to	the	building	worked	toward	a	particular	theatrical	
effect.	The	big	reveal	of	a	horror	intended	to	6igure	the	spectator’s	own	primitive	
drives	 –	 suddenly	 there	 and	 held	 in	 a	 spotlight.	 If	 the	 Gorilla	 House	 presents	
certain	strong	similarities	to	the	Cabinet	of	Dr	Caligari,	the	laboratory	of	the	Mad	
Scientist,	 this	 is	 perhaps	 no	 coincidence.	 For	 there	 is	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	
Lubetkin	may	have	been	inspired	in	his	design	by	the	same	sources.	“There	are	
two	 possible	 methods	 of	 approach	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 zoo	 design”,	 explained	
Lubetkin;	“the	6irst,	which	we	may	call	the	'naturalistic'	method,	is	typi6ied	in	the	
Hamburg	 and	 Paris	 zoos,	 where	 an	 attempt	 is	 made,	 as	 far	 as	 possible,	 to	
reproduce	 the	 natural	 habitat	 of	 each	 animal;	 the	 second	 approach,	which,	 for	
want	 of	 a	 better	 word,	 we	 may	 call	 the	 ‘geometric’,	 consists	 of	 designing	
architectural	 settings	 for	 the	 animals	 in	 such	 a	 way	 as	 to	 present	 them	
dramatically	 to	 the	 public,	 in	 an	 atmosphere	 comparable	 to	 that	 of	 a	 circus.” 	37
Lubetkin	was	committed	to	ensuring	his	enclosures	drew	upon	traditional	spaces	
of	 popular	 entertainment.	His	 elephant-paddock	 at	Whipsnade	 Zoo	 emulates	 a	
Big	Top,	for	instance.	The	famous	Penguin	Pool	at	London	Zoo	resembles	a	Lido.	
And,	perhaps	most	troubling,	his	pit	 for	the	Polar	Bears	at	Dudley	Zoo	can	only	
have	been	modelled	on	the	Elizabethan	Bear-Pit	–	a	vertical	tube	in	which	bears	
were	 set	 upon	 by	 dogs	 for	 the	 amusement	 of	 the	 public.	 In	 the	 light	 of	 this	
commitment	it	seems	at	 least	highly	probable	that	Lubetkin's	6irst	structure	for	
London	Zoo	should	be	based	upon	the	platform	for	the	popular	exhibition	of	the	
gorilla	referenced	by	so	much	cinema	of	the	period.	That	is	to	say,	the	freak-show	
at	a	circus	or	fairground.	
!
This	was	not	lost	on	contemporary	critics.	An	American	critic	for	instance	argued	
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that	the	modernist	projects	at	London	Zoo	had	the	“6lavor	of	a	circus	or	a	country	
carnival”	for	the	“pure	pleasure	and	amusement	of	their	owner”	with	the	result	
being	that	“the	educational	or	scienti6ic	value	of	an	English	zoo	is	nearly	zero”. 	38
In	 a	 recent	 article	 surveying	 the	 legacy	 of	 Bauhaus	 ideas	 in	 the	 UK,	 science-
historian	Peder	Anker	cites	this	passage,	and	explains	that	this	interpretation	of	
the	project	(that	is	to	say,	the	architect's	own	understanding	of	his	zoo	buildings)	
can	 only	 obscure	 the	 very	 real	 scienti6ic	 objectives	 that	 the	 management	 at	
London	 Zoo	 hoped	 to	 achieve	 through	 commissioning	 these	 new	 buildings.	
“Though	 they	welcomed	 entertainment	 that	 could	 generate	 general	 interest	 in	
biology	 (and	 money	 from	 entrance	 fees),	 they	 were	 not	 willing	 to	 pursue	
amusement	at	the	expense	of	their	scienti6ic	integrity”,	insists	Anker.	“It	was	the	
promotion	of	public	health	and	not	amusement	which	prompted	the	Zoo	keepers	
to	 build	modernist	 architecture.”	His	 subsequent	 emphasis	 on	 the	 discourse	 of	
the	 “healthy	 environment”,	 shared	 by	 Zoo	 keepers,	 newspapers	 and	 architects	
alike,	is	entirely	correct,	and	the	article	as	a	whole,	extremely	illuminating.	But	I	
would	like	to	suggest	that	Lubetkin's	conception	of	nature	as	a	circus	for	human	
entertainment	 was	 not	 incompatible	 with	 at	 least	 one	 key	 scienti6ic	 and	
educational	 objective	 of	 the	 London	 Zoological	 Society's	 research	 anatomist,	
Solly	Zuckerman,	who	played	a	major	role	in	securing	the	commission	for	Tecton.		
!
For	much	of	his	 life,	Zuckerman	saw	himself	as	engaged	in	unrelenting	struggle	
against	 the	 cardinal	 error	 of	 inferring	 that	 “comparison	 of	 animal	 and	 human	
social	 life	 will	 enable	 us	 to	 discover	 some	 of	 the	 basic	 instincts	 and	 impulses	
upon	 which	 the	 whole	 edi6ice	 of	 human	 society	 is	 reared” .	 It	 is	 true	 that	39
Zuckerman	 believed	 the	 life	 of	 primates	 to	 be	 a	 crude	 picture	 of	 a	 social	 level	
from	 which	 our	 earliest	 human	 ancestors	 emerged:	 “But”,	 Zuckerman	
immediately	 goes	 on	 to	 say,	 “only	 that”. 	 Contrary	 to	 Anker's	 assertion,	 his	40
landmark	 thesis	 on	 primate	 behaviour,	 The	 Social	 Life	 of	 Monkeys	 and	 Apes	
(1932),	does	not	present	 this	material	 as	 a	model	 for	explaining	deeper	 sexual	
and	 social	 instincts	 in	 humans.	 “Indeed	 much	 could	 be	 said	 for	 divorcing	 the	
study	 of	man's	 behaviour	 from	 that	 of	 other	 animals	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 subject	
matter	 of	 sociological	 discussion”. 	 It	 is	 explained	 that	 “[w]hen	 the	 impetus	41
given	to	biological	inquiry	by	Darwin's	exposition	of	the	evolutionary	hypothesis	
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made	them	prominent	subjects	for	discussion,	both	these	aspects	of	mammalian	
behaviour	were	at	 6irst	considered	together,	and	there	accumulated	a	wealth	of	
literature	to	 6ill	 the	Cartesian	gulf	separating	man	from	the	beasts,	and	proving	
the	continuity	of	mind	and	society	through	the	world	of	living	organisms”. 	Thus	42
Kropotkin's	Mutual	Aid	 (1919)	examined	organised	social	groups	 in	 the	animal	
kingdom	 to	 prove	 that	 progress	 is	 best	 fostered	 by	 the	 practice	 of	mutual	 co-
operation	 and	 support. 	 E.	 Westermarck's	 The	 History	 of	 Human	 Marriage	43
(1921)	 provided	 an	 anecdotal	 account	 of	 the	 “family	 group”	 of	 the	 gorilla,	 in	
order	 to	 establish	 a	 natural	 basis	 for	 the	 human	 institution	 of	marriage. 	 And	44
Yerkes	and	Yerkes	had	taken	certain	facts	about	a	New	World	monkey	to	indicate	
“a	 species	of	 communism”	as	being	 “of	 the	utmost	 importance	 to	mankind”.	 	 	45
Zuckerman	 casts	 a	 caustic	 eye	 on	 that	 “somewhat	 surprising	 discovery	 of	
politico-economic	systems	at	a	biological	level	in	which	work	and	production,	in	
the	economic	sense,	can	hardly	be	thought	of	as	existing”. 	He	proceeds	to	point	46
out	that	 the	mating	habits	of	even	closely	aligned	species	 like	spotted	deer	and	
red	deer	can	differ	enormously:	 “it	 is	even	more	misleading	 to	attempt	 to	 infer	
the	mating	 habits	 of	 the	 6irst	men	 from	 those	 of	 the	 gorilla	 or	 any	 other	 sub-
human	primate”. 	The	Social	Life	of	Monkeys	and	Apes	would	take	a	very	different	47
approach	and	signalled	this	intent	on	the	very	6irst	page,	which	opens	by	quoting	
Hoppius,	 a	 naturalist	 of	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	 who	 advised	 posterity	 that	 “it	
would	 lead	 not	 a	 little	 to	 Philosophy,	 if	 one	 were	 to	 spend	 a	 day”	 with	 apes	
“exploring	how	far	human	wit	exceeds	theirs,	what	distance	lies	between	Brutish	
and	 rational	 discrimination”. 	 The	 book	 that	 follows	 is	 very	 much	 in	 keeping	48
with	 these	 “Cartesian	 principles”,	 providing	 an	 epoch-making	 account	 of	 the	
atrocities	that	took	place	on	Monkey	Hill	between	1925	and	1930.	“It	is	in	their	
demonstration	of	 the	ways	 in	which	human	social	behaviour	has	renounced	 its	
biological	background	that	studies	of	Old	World	apes	and	monkeys	have	greatest	
signi6icance”,	 Zuckerman	 later	 explained,	 in	 his	 article	 on	 “The	 Biological	
Background	of	Human	 Social	 Behaviour”	 (1937);	 “Such	 studies	 do	not	 indicate	
fundamental	limiting	factors	in	primate	social	expressions,	but	they	show	the	full	
extent	 to	 which	 human	 behaviour	 has	 altered	 in	 the	 course	 of	 human	
evolution”. 	The	sexual	violence	in6licted	on	the	living	and	the	dead	on	Monkey	49
Hill	 should	most	 certainly	not	be	 read,	 it	 is	 implied,	 in	order	 to	gain	an	 insight	
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into	what	we	are	as	a	species	–	and	one	suspects	that	the	often	gruesome	details	
in	 Zuckerman's	 account	 were	 intended	 precisely	 to	 forestall	 any	 such	 effort.	
“Those	 who	 study	 the	 social	 behaviour	 of	 apes”,	 he	 continued	 in	 his	
characteristically	dry	fashion,	“in	the	belief	that	they	are	signi6icantly	helping	in	
the	 provision	 of	 data	 that	 will	 allow	 of	 the	 better	 ordering	 of	 human	 society	
would	 appear	 to	 be	 somewhat	 mistaken”. 	 If	 his	 study	 of	 the	 sexual	 power-50
struggles	among	baboons	at	London	Zoo	was	intended	to	serve	this	end,	there	is	
a	terrible	irony	in	the	fact	that	Zuckerman's	account	was	so	often	received	in	the	
opposite	spirit	by	his	readers.	This	is	registered	in	the	postscript	to	the	belated	
second	 edition	 of	 The	 Social	 Life	 of	 Monkeys	 and	 Apes	 (1981),	 in	 which	
Zuckerman	attacked	the	ongoing	misuse	of	information	about	the	social	lives	of	
primates	 to	provide	a	natural	 foundation	 for	 theories	about	mankind's	political	
problems:	 “The	 proposition	 that	 the	 aggressive	 “instincts”	 we	 have	 inherited	
from	 our	 primitive	 forebears	 have	 something	 to	 do	 with	 the	 control	 of	
overpopulation	 or	 possible	 nuclear	 war,	 is	 no	 more	 sophisticated	 or	 useful	 a	
message	 than	was	 the	view	of	Sir	Arthur	Keith,	 that	 renowned	British	physical	
anthropologist	of	the	early	half	of	our	century,	that	“war	is	Nature's	pruning	fork”	
–	a	conclusion	which	he	was	able	to	reach	without	the	bene6it	of	the	writings	of	
latter-day	primatologists”. 		51
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This	is	not	to	say	that	Zuckerman	denied	the	ferocious	sexual	drives	displayed	on	
Monkey	Hill	held	some	place	in	the	unconscious	of	the	human	psyche.	In	fact,	in	
his	article	on	“The	Biological	Background	to	Human	Social	Behaviour”,	he	readily	
identi6ies	 with	 the	 theory,	 developed	 by	 Freud	 in	 Totem	 and	 Taboo,	 that	 “The	
price	of	our	emergence	as	man	would	seem	to	have	been	the	overt	renunciation	
of	a	dominant	primate	impulse	in	the	6ield	of	sex”. 	There	can	be	no	doubt	that	52
Anker	 is	 correct	 to	 suggest	 that	 Zuckerman	 believed,	 “Visitors	 at	 the	 Zoo	
observing	 the	 gorillas	 would	 thus	 also	 observe	 and	 re6lect	 upon	 their	 own	
primitive	desires”. 	But	 it	should	be	recognised	that	this	belief	must	have	been	53
enormously	 complicated	 by	 that	 scientist's	 life-long	 battle	 against	 those	 who	
made	easy	analogical	comparisons	with	the	ways	of	monkeys	and	apes	in	order	
to	 shore	 up	 their	 own	 theories	 on	 human	 society.	 Instead	 of	 ignoring	 the	
elements	in	the	Gorilla	House	that	reference	the	circus	freak-show,	on	the	basis	
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that	 this	 format	 is	 incompatible	 with	 serious	 scienti6ic	 objectives,	 we	 should	
recognise	 this	 aspect	 of	 the	 design	 as	 the	 ful6ilment	 of	 a	 speci6ic	 educational	
requirement.	The	structure	would	permit	the	public	to	witness	“a	crude	picture	
of	that	social	level	from	which	emerged	our	earliest	human	ancestors”	but,	since	
“we	 have	 little	 or	 nothing	 to	 gain	 from	watching	 the	 behaviour	 of	 animals”	 in	
seeking	 “a	 solution	 to	 our	 own	 social	 and	political	 problems”,	 this	 engagement	
with	 the	 ape	 could	 only	 be	 presented	 as	 catharsis. 	 A	 recognition	 of	 our	54
functional	 af6inities	 with	 the	 animal-machine	 in	 order	 to	 induce	 a	 yet	 more	
rigorous	repression	of	that	shared	past.	A	repression	that	would	re-enforce,	since	
in	 Zuckerman's	 philosophy	 it	 originally	 constituted,	 the	 essence	 of	 our	 human	
identity.	 “[It	 is]	 idle	 to	 suppose	 that	because	man	 is	 a	primate,	 and	 sub-human	
primates	 lead	 their	 lives	 blindly	 according	 to	 scales	 of	 dominance	 and	
submission,	 human	 beings	 must	 therefore	 resign	 themselves	 to	 an	 eternity	 of	
con6lict	over	material	things”,	he	insisted,	on	reviewing	his	horri6ic	survey	of	sub-
human	 social	 behaviour.	 “The	 price	 of	 our	 continued	 existence	 may	 well	 be	
further	 repressions	 of	 dominant	 impulses,	 and	 further	 developments	 of	 the	
operative	behaviour	whose	beginnings	can	be	vaguely	seen	in	our	transition	from	
a	simian	to	a	human	level	of	existence”. 						55
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The	 estrangement	 that	 “pulp”	 elements	 in	 the	 design	 of	 the	 Gorilla	 House	
effected	therefore	served	an	important	purpose.	Like	much	of	the	cinema	of	the	
period,	 Lubetkin’s	 theatre	 offered	 scope	 for	 a	 popular	 ritual	 of	 regression:	 the	
primitive	drives	that	threatened	civilised	society	were	not	permitted	to	fester	in	
darkness,	 but	were	 rendered	 safe	 by	 being	 brought	 to	 light.	 Lubetkin's	 Gorilla	
House	 rigorously	 asserted	 throughout	 the	 viewing	 experience	 the	 traditional	
Cartesian	 gulf	 between	 Human	 subject	 and	 the	 Animal	 object,	 preventing	 that	
process	 of	 “anthropomorphising”	 that	 Solly	 Zuckerman	 feared	 and	 wished	 to	
guard	against.		
!
In	 Bertold	 Lubetkin	 the	 London	 Zoological	 Society	 had	 found	 exactly	 the	 right	
architect	 to	 respond	 to	 Zuckerman's	 concerns	 over	 how	 the	 lives	 of	 the	 great	
apes	might	 be	 interpreted	 by	 an	 uninformed	 public.	 As	 architectural	 historian	
John	 Allan	 has	 observed,	 the	 theatrical	 approach	 is	 “readily	 traced	 back	 to	
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Lubetkin's	 philosophic	 commitment	 to	 the	 rationalist	 ideal”. 	 Allan	 notes	 that	56
the	 architect	 chose	 to	 place	 a	 Corinthian	 capital	 (unearthed	 in	 the	 course	 of	
excavation;	part	of	the	Nashe	project	in	this	district	during	the	Regency)	next	to	
the	 entrance	 like	 a	 talisman,	 or	 an	 embryonic	 caryatid.	 “For	 Lubetkin,	 even	 a	
gorilla	house	was	not	merely	a	machine	for	gorillas	to	live	in:	it	was	a	declaration	
of	 human	 values”. 	 The	 architect's	 own	 daughter	 describes	 this	 commitment	57
rather	more	bluntly:	 “He	believed	 that	 human	 reason	was	 an	 irresistible	 force;	
that	science	would	unlock	every	secret,	cure	every	ill,	and	that	human	beings,	by	
virtue	of	 their	rationality,	were	superior	 to	all	other	 forms	of	 life”.	Her	 father	 is	
said	 to	 have	 clung	 to	 these	 credenda	 “6iercely	 and	 proclaimed	 them	 with	 a	
passion	which	was	anything	but	rational”. 	In	her	account	of	a	childhood	on	the	58
Gloucestershire	 farm	 that	 Lubetkin	 took	 over	 after	 retiring	 from	 the	 capital,	
Louise	 Kehoe	 relates	 how	 these	 beliefs	 propelled	 the	 builder	 of	 zoos	 into	
pioneering	new	industrial	methods	of	farming,	including	one	contraption	that	he	
called	 a	 “cattle	 crush”	 –	 which	 apparently	 did	 just	 what	 the	 name	 implied.	
“Factory	 farming	 had	 not	 then	 been	 invented,	 but	 he	 discovered	 it	 for	 himself,	
turning	 his	 architectural	 skills	 to	 the	 task	 of	 designing	 slat-6loored	 prisons	 in	
which	 pigs	 and	 cows	 could	 be	 immobilized	 and	 forcibly,	 repeatedly	 mated	 to	
ensure	the	best	yield	of	offspring	with	the	least	fallow	time”. 	Kehoe	is	quick	to	59
add	 that	Lubetkin	was	not	unsympathetic	 to	his	animals;	he	could	be	kind	and	
took	great	pleasure	in	watching	their	antics.	But	his	philosophy	bound	him	to	the	
idea	 that	 the	 Animal	 is	 a	machine,	 while	 only	 the	 Human	 can	 be	 said	 to	 have	
mind.	 His	 zoo	 buildings	 aggressively	 insist	 upon	 this	 fact	 in	 an	 era	 when	 this	
tenet	 central	 to	 the	 Cartesian	 tradition	 seemed	 to	 have	 been	 threatened	 by	
Darwinism	 and	 the	 discovery	 of	 the	 Anthropoid.	 As	 Kehoe	 obverses,	 “by	
juxtaposing	 the	 cool,	 mathematical	 precision	 of	 pure	 geometric	 shapes	 –	
cylinders,	 spirals,	 ellipses,	 cast	 in	 thin	 sections	 of	 white	 reinforced	 concrete	 –	
with	 the	 lumbering	 gait	 and	 awkward,	 unre6ined	 behaviour	 of	 the	 captive	
tenants,	he	made	clowns	and	performers	of	 them	in	spite	of	 themselves”. 	The	60
animal	is	held	in	patterns	from	Euclidean	geometry,	mapped	on	a	Cartesian	grid,	
that	 testify	 to	 the	 all-encompassing	 power	 of	 the	 rational	 mind.	 “The	 animals	
became	 living	monuments	 to	 rationalism,	 imprisoned	 not	 so	much	 by	 bars	 or	
cages,	but	by	their	intellectual	inferiority	to	humankind,	whose	will	had	wrought	
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the	seamless,	soaring	concrete	canopies	that	sheltered	them”. 	61
!
In	many	of	the	zoo	buildings	this	tendency	is	not	nearly	as	pronounced	as	Kehoe	
suggests	and	Lubetkin	has	been	justly	hailed	for	developing	a	new	form	of	civic	
architecture	that	permitted	unprecedented	interactions	between	man	and	beast.	
But	 as	 Louis	 MacNeice	 recognised,	 on	 viewing	 the	 structure	 shortly	 after	 its	
completion,	 there	 was	 something	 excessive	 in	 the	 Gorilla	 House's	 formal	
emphasis	on	circulation	and	control.			
!
	 Beyond	the	Elephant	House	is	one	of	the	very	newest	and	grandest	of	the	
	 Zoo	buildings,	the	circular	gorilla	House	of	white	concrete	[...]	by	Messers.	
	 Tecton.	This	is	all	gadgets,	central		heating,	 coddling	 and	 slickness,	 and,	
	 like	all	this	6irm's	designs,	is,	aesthetically,	a	tri6le	frigid.	We	must	of	course	
	 always	plump	for	the	animal's	health	and	comfort	rather	than	for	our	own,	
	 probably	 sentimental,	 certainly	 irrelevant,	delight	 in	a	more	homely	and	
	 cowshed	atmosphere,	but	all	the	same	we	may	remember	that	Alfred,	the	
	 Bristol	gorilla	[...]	has	lived	in	perfect	health	for	years	in	much	more	primi-
	 tive	 quarters	 without	 any	 of	 this	 air-conditioning	 or	 up-to-the-minute	
	 setting.	And	we	may	remember	that	Americans,	with	all	their	science-in-
	 the-home	and	centrally	heated	houses,	beat	 the	world	when	 it	 comes	 to	
	 catching	colds. 	62
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Ostensibly	 there	to	protect	 the	gorillas	 from	air-borne	 infection	and	a	northern	
climate	to	which	they	were	not	adapted,	the	obtrusive	nature	of	the	systems	for	
air-conditioning,	running	water,	sliding	dust-screen,	revolving	sun-room,	are	said	
to	 represent	an	unwarranted	 thoroughness	of	 treatment.	 In	point	of	 fact,	 these	
elements	seem	to	have	been	lifted	from	the	design	for	a	Tuberculosis	Clinic	that	
was	never	eventually	built. 	When	the	care	taken	over	the	formal	integration	of	63
measures	 for	 the	 6low	 of	 human	 traf6ic	 through	 the	 building	 is	 also	 taken	 into	
account	it	becomes	evident	these	systems	were	not	in	place	merely	for	the	sake	
of	the	gorillas,	but	were	part	of	a	wider	preoccupation	on	the	part	of	the	architect	
with	the	aesthetics	of	circulation	and	control.	“In	the	new	house	the	audience	is	
encouraged	to	keep	moving:	porches,	entrances	and	public	spaces	are	designed	
to	give	directions	to	the	visitor	and	to	propel	him	forward”,	runs	a	contemporary	
report	in	the	journal	for	Architectural	Designs	and	Construction,	June	1933.	“The	
old	game	of	discovering	family	likenesses	at	the	Zoo	is,	therefore,	discouraged”. 	64
This	attention	to	the	structure's	formal	emphasis	upon	movement	is	also	evident	
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in	 the	 6ilm	 on	 the	 modernist	 architecture	 at	 London	 and	Whipsnade	 by	 Lazlo	
Maholy-Nagy,	 referred	 to	 in	 earlier	 in	 this	 article,	 in	 which	 a	 series	 of	 simple	
animations	 highlight	 the	 kinetic	 properties	 of	 the	 Gorilla	 House	 and	 Penguin	
Pool.	Signi6icantly,	the	treatment	of	the	two	gorillas	in	this	motion	picture	differs	
considerably	 from	 that	 accorded	 the	 other	 zoo	 animals;	 while	 giraffes	 and	
penguins	 are	 captured	 rushing	 through	 their	 new	 enclosures,	 in	 shots	 that	
convey	an	exhilarating	sensation	of	freedom	and	speed,	the	gorillas	alone	do	not	
move,	but	cling	and	stare	as	the	building	itself	moves	about	them.	The	freedom	of	
movement	celebrated	in	this	section	of	the	6ilm	is	not	proper	to	the	gorillas,	but	a	
property	 of	 the	 machine	 they	 inhabit;	 while	 the	 other	 structures	 suggest	
movement,	 only	 the	 Gorilla	 House	 is	 a	 moving	 object;	 while	 the	 rest	 seem	 to	
inspire	 a	 delight	 in	 movement	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 animals,	 the	 Gorilla	 House	
reduces	the	apes	it	contains	to	passive	spectators.	
!
The	 architect's	 preoccupation	 with	 a	 systematic	 regulation	 of	 circulation	 is	 a	
striking	 manifestation	 of	 a	 concept	 that	 has	 been	 a	 characteristic	 element	 in	
European	thought	since	the	Enlightenment:	the	metaphor	of	circulation.	As	David	
Trotter	has	shown	in	his	book	on	this	subject,	over	the	course	of	the	eighteenth	
and	nineteenth	century	this	concept,	initially	derived	from	medicine,	became	an	
all-encompassing	 metaphor	 that	 politicians,	 economists,	 urban	 planners,	
philosophers	and	philanthropists	applied	to	an	extraordinary	range	of	different	
problems,	 enabling	 them	 to	 formulate	 and	 install	 those	 systems	 that	 our	
technological,	highly-populated	and	urbanised	civilisation	now	depends	upon. 	65
‘The	 formula	 is	as	simple	as	can	be’,	 remarks	Wolfgang	Schivelbusch:	 ‘whatever	
was	part	of	circulation	was	regarded	as	healthy,	progressive,	constructive;	all	that	
was	detached	from	circulation,	on	the	other	hand,	appeared	diseased,	medieval,	
subversive,	 threatening’. 	 It	 should	 come	 as	 no	 surprise	 that	 we	 should	 6ind	66
Zuckerman	 struggling	 for	 this	word	 in	 the	 thirties	when	he	 came	 to	de6ine	 the	
essence	of	culture,	that	which	sets	us	apart	from	the	rest	of	the	animal	world:	“By	
virtue	of	the	tools	we	construct,	we	organize	our	lives	to	a	large	extent	according	
to	means	of	production	and	exchange”,	he	claimed. 	And	Zuckerman	expressed	67
this	idea	more	stridently	in	later	years,	having	talked	with	Lévi-Strauss:	“I	believe	
Lévi-Strauss	to	be	right	when	he	makes	the	point	that	“humanization”	implies	a	
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synthesis	 of	 a	 number	 of	 cultural	 elements	 (among	which	 exchange	 is	 critical)	
which,	 as	 it	were,	 became	 combined	 in	 a	 6lash”	 (my	 italics). 	No	 less	 than	 the	68
Corinthian	 capital	 set	 up	 at	 the	 entrance,	 Lubtkin's	 formal	 emphasis	 on	
circulation	 is	an	emphatic	expression,	not	merely	of	western	civilisation,	but	of	
“human”	values,	as	formulated	in	the	Enlightenment.	The	animal	that	might	have	
successfully	aped	our	human	capacity	to	respond	is	held	immobile	in	the	midst	of	
systems	 for	 the	 circulation	 of	 light,	 water,	 air,	 heat	 and	 the	 crowd,	 powerless	
within	a	cultural	paradigm	that	had	become	the	entelechy	of	that	Logos	proper	to	
man.	 No	 longer	 free	 to	 say	 “I	 am”,	 but	 bound	 within	 a	 fearsome	 structure	 of	
thought,	 the	 inmates	are	given	space	 to	play	only	at	being	what	we	 think	of	 as	
gorilla:	 in	 this	 instance,	 as	has	been	suggested,	 the	embodiment	of	a	peculiarly	
human	 quality,	 a	 culturally	 speci6ic	 notion	 of	 the	 bestiality	 of	 the	 Id.	 Mok	 and	
Moina	were	 in	 one	 sense	 dead	 on	 the	moment	 of	 arrival;	 they	 could	 only	 ever	
have	been	experienced	as	human	artefacts,	in	the	House	of	Light.	
!
In	 closing	 this	 section	 I	 would	 like	 to	 indicate	 that	 the	 formal	 procedures	
employed	 in	 the	Tecton	Gorilla	House	 are	by	no	means	unique,	 but	might	well	
re6lect	a	more	general	tendency	in	that	phase	of	theory	and	practice	to	which	the	
term	Modernist	 is	 applied.	 To	demonstrate	 this	 effectively	would	 require	more	
space	than	is	here	available.	But	an	examination	of	an	extract	from	a	monumental	
work	of	 literary	modernism	may	 serve	 to	 show	 that	 the	 aggressive	procedures	
set	 out	 in	 this	 essay	 can	 cast	 light	 on	 analogous	 structures	 in	 material	 by	
modernist	writers	and	artists,	thereby	contributing	to	the	ground-breaking	work	
currently	being	conducted	on	the	Modernist	Animal	by	Carrie	Rohman	and	Carey	
Wolfe. 	 Published	 a	 year	 after	 the	 completion	 of	 the	 Gorilla	 House	 at	 London	69
Zoo,	the	passage	of	poetry	at	the	start	of	this	essay,	the	translation	of	the	Punic	
Periplus	 of	 Hanno	 the	Navigator,	 is	 in	 fact	 a	 component	 in	 The	 Cantos	 of	 Ezra	
Pound,	 one	 of	 the	 largest	 fragments	 in	 that	 monster	 mosaic	 inspired	 by	 the	
glittering	 canopy	of	 the	Galla	Placidia,	Ravenna:	 the	 circle	of	 gold	 in	 the	 gloom	
that	 gathers	 the	 light	 against	 it.	 Hanno's	 gorillas	 are	 one	 luminous	 detail	 in	
Pound's	 epic	 poem.	 They	 too	 have	 been	 enclosed	 in	 a	 house	 of	 light.	 Having	
studied	 the	 role	 that	 these	 apes	 were	 compelled	 to	 perform	 in	 a	
contemporaneous	modernist	structure,	we	are	now	in	a	position	to	contend	that,	
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though	overlooked	by	previous	commentators	on	Canto	XL,	the	gorillas	represent	
a	discourse	central	to	a	full	understanding	of	the	themes	developed	in	that	text.		
!
Critics	 have	 noted	 that	 the	 6inancial	 conspiracies,	 war-pro6iteering	 and	
institutionalized	swindling	that	occupy	the	poet's	attention	in	the	6irst	part	of	the	
canto	 are	 counterpointed	by	Hanno's	periplus;	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 “a	 journey	not	by	
6ixed	charts	or	stars,	but	by	intuition	and	reason;	not	by	plotting	a	course	ahead	
on	paper,	but	by	looking	directly	at	what	is	in	front	of	you	and	acting	accordingly”.	
Or	as	Pound	himself	puts	it	in	Canto	LIX:	“periplum,	not	as	land	looks	on	a	map	/	
but	as	sea	bord	seen	by	men	sailing.” 	In	contrast	to	the	destructive	activities	of	70
the	 war-pro6iteers	 we	 are	 presented	 with	 the	 exemplary	 account	 of	 a	 ancient	
voyage	of	discovery	that	represents	a	valuable	contribution	to	human	knowledge.	
An	equivalent	to	Pound's	project	in	fact,	the	periplus	is	a	recurring	motif	in	The	
Cantos. 		71
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But	there	is	mystery	and	speculation	surrounding	Hanno's	account,	of	which	Ezra	
Pound	cannot	have	been	unaware.	As	B.H.	Warmington	noted	 in	1964,	a	whole	
literature	of	scholarship	had	grown	up	round	the	report:	he	explains	that	“From	
everything	we	know	about	Carthaginian	practice,	 the	resolute	determination	to	
keep	all	knowledge	of	and	access	 to	 the	western	markets	 from	the	Greeks,	 it	 is	
incredible	 that	 they	 would	 have	 allowed	 the	 publication	 of	 an	 accurate	
description	 of	 the	 voyage	 for	 all	 to	 read”. 	 The	 interest	 of	 Hanno's	 Periplus	72
resides	not	 so	much	 in	what	has	been	 recorded	as	 in	what	has	been	omitted	–	
that	which	 the	Cartheginians	were	 looking	 for	 in	 Senegal	 (Sene	Khole:	 river	 of	
gold).	“The	very	purpose	of	the	voyage,	the	consolidation	of	the	route	to	the	gold	
market,	is	not	even	mentioned”. 	The	signi6icance	of	this	omission	is	signalled	in	73
Pound's	translation	by	a	capital	mid-sentence,	at	the	point	the	Carthaginian	ships	
mysteriously	 turn	 back	 on	 themselves,	 presumably	 to	 deposit	 their	 newly-
acquired	cargo,	before	proceeding	into	the	unknown:	“Next	is	a	river	wide,	full	of	
water	/	crocodiles,	 river	horses,	Thence	we	turned	back	to	Cyrne	/	 for	12	days	
coasted	the	shore	/	Aethiops	6led	at	our	coming	/	Our	Lixtae	cd.	not	understand	
them.” 	The	possibility	so	unlikely	in	the	6irst	half	of	the	canto	has	been	realised	74
in	 the	 second.	 “If	 a	 nation	will	master	 its	money”,	 the	 poet	 sighed,	 and	 in	 this	
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object-lesson	from	the	past,	Pound	has	shown	how	this	was	once	achieved.	The	
periplus	 is	an	emblem	of	a	Latin	motto	cited	at	 the	start	of	Eleven	New	Cantos	
(1934)	–	“Tempus	 loquendi	/	Tempus	tacendi.” 	–	The	report	 is	a	public	secret	75
that	 enables	 the	 State	 to	 maintain	 an	 absolute	 control	 over	 the	 medium	 of	
exchange	and	the	circulation	of	wealth.			
!
Privateers	have	been	forestalled	by	a	political	expedient	on	the	part	of	the	Prince.	
Given	 the	 extent	 to	which	 the	 gorilla	 in	 this	 period	 represented	 precisely	 that	
blurring	of	ontological	categories	that	Pound	execrated	elsewhere	in	The	Cantos,	
their	 violent	 treatment	must	 represent	 a	 triumph	 over	 that	 error.	 Throughout	
that	 poem	 “obstructors	 of	 knowledge,	 /	 obstructors	 of	 distribution”	 are	
associated	with	 types	of	 animal,	 and	 the	evil	 of	usura,	 “corrupter	of	 all	 things”,	
cutting	loose	the	signi6ier	from	the	signi6ied,	 is	represented	as	Satan-Geryon,	or	
Neschek	—	that	is,	as	irredeemably	hybrid. 	In	Pound's	vision	the	achievement	76
of	earthly	harmony	 is	 inextricably	bound	up	with	the	extirpation	of	 the	bestial:	
“The	fourth;	the	dimension	of	stillness”	requires	one	to	exercise	“the	power	over	
wild	 beasts”. 	 The	 6irst	 recorded	 encounter	 with	 the	 gorilla	 is	 therefore	 re-77
enacted	to	serve	a	de6inite	purpose.	The	species	that	was	the	embodiment	of	that	
lack	of	“clear	demarcation”,	hated	by	Pound,	is	emptied	of	being. 	“Killed,	6layed,	78
brought	back	their	pelts	 to	Carthage”. 	According	to	Roman	historian	Pliny,	 the	79
Prince	 “placed	 the	 skins	 of	 two	 of	 these	 females	 in	 the	 temple	 of	 Juno,	 which	
were	to	be	seen	until	the	capture	of	Carthage”. 	Like	Mok	and	Moina,	the	gorillas	80
in	 Pound's	 Canto	 are	 put	 on	 public	 display,	 a	 necessary	 sacri6ice	 to	 that	
regulation	of	circulation	that	constitutes	the	basis	for	the	culture	celebrated	and	
signi6ied	by	the	House	of	Light.	An	image	of	this	radiant	temple,	to	which	these	
artefacts	are	dedicated,	concludes	Canto	XL.				
!
	 To	the	high	air,	to	the	stratosphere,	to	the	imperial	
	 calm,	to	the	empyrean,	to	the	baily	of	the	four	towers	
	 the	NOUS,	the	ineffable	crystal:	
	 Karxedonion	Basileos	
	 	 hung	this	with	his	map	in	their	temple. 	81
!
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IV.	
THE	RATIONAL	ANIMAL	
!
The	formal	procedures	employed	in	the	Tecton	Gorilla	House	may	re6lect	a	more	
general	 tendency	 in	 that	 phase	 of	 theory	 and	 practice	 to	 which	 the	 term	
Modernist	is	applied,	though	to	demonstrate	this	effectively	would	require	more	
space	than	is	here	available.	I	want	to	suggest	that	the	subsequent	application	of	
Lubetkin's	 Cartesian	 architecture	 to	 the	 human	 environment	 ultimately	
constituted	 a	 form	 of	 subtle	 violence	 in6licted	 upon	 the	 concept	 of	 the	Human	
Being	–	by	that	concept	and	 in	the	name	of	 that	concept	–	 in	 the	act	of	naming	
that	 concept.	 In	 a	 6inal	 twist,	 the	working-class	 visitors	who	 6locked	 to	 see	 the	
gorillas	 in	 the	 house	 of	 light	 had	 encountered	 a	 foreshadowing	 of	 their	 own	
alienation.	As	John	Berger	pointed	out	in	1977,	in	the	post-war	era	people	would	
perceive	 in	 captive	 animals	 (in	 spite	 of	 Zuckerman's	 efforts)	 a	 template	 that	
might	“help	us	to	understand,	accept	and	overcome	the	stresses	involved	in	living	
in	consumer	societies”. 		82
!
Though	many	 post-war	modernist	 housing-projects	were	 lovingly	 created	 they	
are	 undeniably	 totalitarian	 environments.	 Everything	 is	worked	 out,	 either	 for	
good	 or	 ill,	 by	 the	 architect.	 Like	 the	 animals	 in	 London	 Zoo,	 the	 inhabitants	
occupy	 a	 space	 that	 leaves	 nothing	 open	 to	 chance	 or	 change,	 but	which	 have	
built	 speci6ically	 in	 order	 to	 foster	 what	 the	 architect	 perceived	 to	 be	 the	
essential	characteristic	of	human	being:	a	capacity	for	rational	thought.	In	at	last	
realising	on	that	basis	 the	complete	separation	of	our	species	 from	every	other	
animal	on	the	planet,	many	inhabitants	of	the	post-war	New	Reality	soon	found	
themselves	physically	trapped	in	a	habit	of	thought,	one	that	has	often	produced	
remarkable	 results,	 but	 which	 is	 still	 very	 much	 a	 habit,	 merely	 one	 way	 of	
thinking,	 crippling	 our	 personal	 capacity	 for	 re-creation.	 An	 architect	 might	
create	 spaces	 for	 play	 in	 the	 most	 successful	 complexes,	 as	 in	 Le	 Corbusier's	
Unite	de	Habitation	 in	Marseilles,	but	even	a	playful	totalitarian	space	leaves	no	
space	for	that	re-creation,	the	reinvention	of	the	self,	that	is	be	all	and	end	all	of	
recreation.	The	architect	may	have	been	 in	a	playful	mood,	but	 the	occupant	 is	
not	free	to	say	“I	am”	or	“I	will	be”.		
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In	 such	 total	 environments,	with	 no	 outlet	 for	 creative	 participation,	 residents	
are	deprived	of	a	capacity	which	has	been	thought	of	as	proper	to	mankind	–	but	
which	can	be	shown	to	belong	in	some	measure	to	every	living	thing.	As	Charles	
Darwin	pointed	out	birds,	 for	 instance,	 in	choosing	a	mate,	will	 select	 that	bird	
with	 the	 plumage	 they	 6ind	 most	 appealing;	 over	 time	 such	 choices	 will	
transform	 the	 secondary	 sexual	 characteristics	 of	 any	 given	 species. 	 This	83
observation	is	vertiginous	because	in	a	mere	paragraph	Darwin	has	shown	how	
other	species	can	be	said	to	respond	–	to	say	what	they	are	or	what	they	will	be	–	
to	modify	and	enrich	their	world.			
!
In	 short,	 the	 modernist	 urban-planning	 initiated	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 by	
Lubetkin's	Gorilla	House	propelled	us	into	a	new	phase	in	our	thinking	regarding	
“the	 Animal”.	 We	 had	 imposed	 on	 our	 own	 species	 that	 passivity	 which	 has	
throughout	recorded	history	been	entailed	upon	“the	Animal”,	and	had	done	so	in	
the	very	act	of	rendering	that	difference	absolute.	In	moving	beyond	that	shared	
tragedy,	the	recognition	of	this	capacity	for	self-creation	is	providing	the	basis	for	
the	 participatory	 practices	 currently	 being	 introduced	 in	 both	 zoos	 and	 the	
human	environment.	Far	from	eliminating	the	differences	between	humans	and	
animals	(as	in	well	intentioned,	but	6lawed,	attempts	to	extend	Human	Rights	to	
other	 species,	 this	 post-modernist	 approach	 provides	 scope	 for	 the	
multiplication	of	difference.	
!
!
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